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Abstract: 
European Union member countries are currently exposed to negative implications of the economic 
and debt crisis. Questions associated with disputable implications of fiscal incentives seem to be 
contrary to the crucial need of the effective fiscal consolidation that is necessary to reduce excessive 
fiscal deficits and high sovereign debts. While challenges addressed to the fiscal policy and its anti-
cyclical potential rose steadily but not desperately since the beginning of the economic crisis, the call 
for fiscal consolidation became urgent almost immediately and this need significantly strengthen after 
the debt crisis contagion flooded Europe. 
In the paper we provide an overview of main trends in public budgets and sovereign debts in ten 
European transition economies during last two decades. We identify episodes of successful and 
unsuccessful (cold showers versus gradual) fiscal (expenditure versus revenue based) consolidations 
by analyzing effects of improvements in cyclically adjusted primary balance on the sovereign debt 
ratio reduction. We also estimate VAR model to analyze effects of fiscal shocks (based on one 
standard deviation in total expenditure, direct and indirect taxes) to real output. It is expected that 
responses of real output to different types of (consolidating) fiscal shocks may vary and thus provide 
more precise ideas about a feasibility (i.e. side effects on the macroeconomic performance) of 
expenditure versus revenue based fiscal consolidation episodes. Economic effects of fiscal 
consolidating adjustments are evaluated for two periods (pre-crisis and extended) to reveal crisis 
effects on fiscal consolidation efforts. 
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1. Introduction 
European Union member countries are currently exposed to negative implications of 
the economic and debt crisis. Questions associated with disputable implications of fiscal 
incentives seem to be contrary to the crucial need of the effective fiscal consolidation that is 
necessary to reduce excessive fiscal deficits and high sovereign debts. As a result, 
governments tend to reduce public expenditures and raise taxes during the periods lagging 
recession and thus cooling down economies. However, an appropriate composition of fiscal 
incentives without direct negative effect on the public budget and its revenue and expenditure 
sides may help to reduce negative budgetary pressures through increased tax capacity of the 
economy followed by stronger growth of real output. 
While challenges addressed to the fiscal policy and its anti-cyclical potential rose 
steadily but not desperately since the beginning of the economic crisis, the call for fiscal 
consolidation became urgent almost immediately and this need significantly strengthen after 
the debt crisis contagion flooded Europe. 
The overall success of the fiscal consolidation may seem to differ across countries 
reflecting the overall burden of sovereign debt and associated costs of debt service. 
Significant reduction in primary budget deficit (aiming to primary surplus during a reasonable 
period) is the only way to reduce a negative impact of sovereign debt on economic growth. 
While the need to reduce a fiscal imbalance is clear, the composition (expenditure versus 
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revenues based consolidation) and nature (gradual or sharp consolidation) of fiscal 
consolidation, together with the role played by accompanied policies (quantitative monetary 
easing, exchange rate internal versus external devaluation, reforms of fiscal institutions, etc.), 
seems to be quite disputable (Barrios - Langedijk - Penc 2010).  
In the paper we provide an overview of main trends in public budgets and sovereign 
debts in ten European transition economies during last two decades. We identify episodes of 
successful and unsuccessful (cold showers versus gradual) fiscal (expenditure versus revenue 
based) consolidations by analyzing effects of improvements in cyclically adjusted primary 
balance on the sovereign debt ratio reduction. We also estimate VAR model to analyze effects 
of fiscal shocks (based on one standard deviation (fall) in total expenditure and (rise) in direct 
and indirect taxes) to real output. It is expected that responses of real output to the different 
types of (consolidating) fiscal shocks may vary and thus provide more precise ideas about a 
feasibility (i.e. side effects on the macroeconomic performance) of expenditure versus 
revenue based fiscal consolidation episodes. Economic effects of fiscal consolidating 
adjustments are evaluated for two periods (pre-crisis and extended) to reveal crisis effects on 
fiscal consolidation efforts. 
Following the introduction, we provide some stylized facts about fiscal stance in the 
European transition economies over the period of last two decades. We emphasize main 
trends in the evolution of government consumption, rate of secondary redistribution, total 
expenditures and total revenues, fiscal deficit and sovereign debt. In the third section we 
provide an overview of current empirical evidence about fiscal consolidation and fiscal policy 
shocks. Wide range of causal effects and implications of expenditure and tax revenue based 
fiscal adjustments as well as their size and durability seem to be well documented in papers 
published in last two decades. Fourth section begins with some methodological remarks to 
fiscal consolidation and cyclically adjusted primary balance. Subsequent analysis of fiscal 
consolidation episodes provides an in-depth insight into the degree of success of expenditure 
and tax revenue based fiscal adjustments in the view of a sustainable sovereign debt reduction 
in the European transition economies. In section five we deal with fiscal policy shocks trying 
to provide some alternative guideline for evaluation of side economic effects related to 
expenditure and tax based fiscal adjustments on the real output performance. 
 
2. Overview of Fiscal Stance 
Budgetary development in the European transition economies did not follow the same 
trend, though some common patterns seem to be present. In general, relative share of total 
government consumption on overall aggregate expenditures seems to be quite low during last 
two decades (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 General Government Consumption (1995-2011) 
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Note: General government consumption is expressed as a percentage shares on GDP. 
Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from Eurostat - Government Finance Statistics (October 2012) 
and IMF - International Financial Statistics (March 2013). 
 
However, there seem to be notable differences among countries especially if we 
emphasize a relative importance as well as the overall trend in the development of the general 
government consumption. At the beginning of the observed period the overall share of the 
government consumption in Bulgaria and Hungary nearly doubled the share in the Czech 
republic and Romania, leaving remaining countries somewhere in the middle. While in 
Bulgaria the overall share of government expenditures dropped dramatically soon after 1996-
1997 financial crisis as a result of implemented reforms, the situation in Hungary improved 
gradually and slow. The overall share the general government consumption on the total output 
remained quite different even at the end of the observed period though it seems that effects of 
economic crisis contributed to slight reduction in this gap in the whole group of countries. At 
the same time we emphasize a relatively persistent decreasing trend in the Estonia, Lithuania, 
Romania and the Slovak republic, especially since the beginning of the 2000s till the end of 
the pre-crisis period. 
Rate of the secondary income redistribution represents one of the most crucial 
indicators of the government size (Figure 2). It is also convenient to emphasize the size of 
payable interests to calculate primary government expenditures to express a structural fiscal 
stance of the government. 
 
Figure 2 Size of Government - Rate of Secondary Income Redistribution (1995-2011) 
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Note: Variables - primary government expenditures (GOV_EP) and payable interests (GOV_EI) are expressed 
as percentage shares on GDP. 
Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from Eurostat - Government Finance Statistics (October 2012) 
and IMF - International Financial Statistics (March 2013). 
 
The size of the government in the European transition economies seems to be quite 
stable with the generally positive (decreasing) long-term trend during last two decades. 
However, we have also observed few sub-periods of relatively sharp decreasing trend in the 
rate of secondary income redistribution in each particular country: Bulgaria (1996-1997 and 
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2004-2006), the Czech republic (1995-1996, 2003-2004), Estonia (1999-2001), Hungary 
(1995-1997 and 2002-2004), Latvia (1999-2001), Lithuania (1997-1998 and 2000-2003), 
Poland (1996-2000), Romania (2000-2003), the Slovak republic (1997-1998, 2001-2007) and 
Slovenia (2006-2007). At the same time we have experienced a sub-periods of relatively 
sharp increase in primary government expenditures share only in Bulgaria (1995-2000). 
Alongside mostly positive development of the government presence in domestic 
economies in the selected group of countries that we have observed from the analysis of the 
public expenditures ratio, a sovereign debt to GDP ratio did not provide clear information. 
While in in the Czech republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia the ratio steadily rose (though 
at different rates) since the beginning of the previous decade till the end of the pre-crisis 
period reflecting persisting pressures in the fiscal stance as a result of prevailing mismatch in 
government expenditures and revenues, in the rest of countries from the group the ratio 
remained stable or steadily decreased (most notably in the Slovak republic). We suggest that 
the main cause of this negative trend is associated with the structural inconsistency between 
shares of expenditures and revenues on the GDP in the public sector (Table 1) reflecting 
frequent changes in fiscal stance originated in discrete adjustments quite sensitive to changes 
in the political cycle. 
 
Table 1 Total Revenues and Total Expenditures (1995-2011) 
 
 Total expenditures Total Revenues 
1995-1998 1999-2002 2003-2006 2007-2011 1995-1998 1999-2002 2003-2006 2007-2011 
Bulgaria 41.72 40.34 37.34 38.42 37.44 40.20 38.43 37.09 
Czech republic 45.05 43.34 44.56 42.72 38.96 38.51 40.78 39.38 
Estonia 39.33 36.71 34.00 39.62 39.88 35.84 35.85 39.37 
Hungary 52.08 49.08 50.25 50.16 45.48 43.72 42.48 47.45 
Latvia 37.68 37.55 36.24 40.31 37.56 34.83 35.35 35.14 
Lithuania 40.14 37.50 33.24 38.76 35.26 34.65 32.30 33.46 
Poland 47.38 42.97 43.65 43.81 42.83 39.01 38.83 38.63 
Romania 34.34 37.25 34.04 39.33 31.05 33.60 32.51 33.33 
Slovak republic 49.27 47.44 38.08 37.76 43.03 38.84 35.30 32.86 
Slovenia 46.59 46.55 45.46 47.37 43.05 43.27 43.52 43.36 
 
Note: Fiscal indicators are expressed as percentage shares on GDP. 
Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from Eurostat - Government Finance Statistics (October 2012) 
and IMF - International Financial Statistics (March 2013). 
 
As a one the most crucial aspects representing key features of the general government 
financial stance overview we emphasize risks of increasing sovereign debt burden associate 
with fiscal deficits that European transition economies are experiencing during the whole 
period of last two decades (Figure 3). 
 Relatively high rates of the real output growth (especially since the beginning of the 
2000s) helped European transition economies (with exception for Hungary and Poland) to 
stabilize shares of severing debt and nearly to stop its increasing burden till the end of pre-
crisis period. However, a positive trend in the fiscal deficit reduction during the near pre-crisis 
period was associated with significantly improved ratio of sovereign debt to GDP only in 
Bulgaria, the Slovak republic and Lithuania. At the same time, Baltic countries (with 
exception for Lithuania during the period 1999-2003) were able to maintain generally low 
level of sovereign debt (under 20 percent) during whole pre-crisis period. As a result, more 
comprehensive analysis of the budgetary stance is needed to identify the overall potential as 
well as effectiveness of a fiscal consolidation to successfully reduce a sovereign debt burden 
provided that debt constraints strengthened during the crisis period. 
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Figure 3 Fiscal Deficit and Sovereign Debt (1995-2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: All fiscal indicators are expressed as percentage shares on GDP. 
Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from Eurostat - Government Finance Statistics (October 2012) 
and IMF - International Financial Statistics (March 2013). 
 
Fiscal implications of the economic crisis vary across European Union member 
countries provided quite differing financial discipline of fiscal authorities (levels of fiscal 
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budget balance and sovereign debt), overall macroeconomic performance and high level of 
heterogeneity of individual markets that in common conjunction affects overall costs of fiscal 
consolidation (European Commission, 2012).  
The problem of say about a permanent deficiency of general government budgets 
stresses many “old” (Austria, France, Greece, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal) as well 
as “new” (Cyprus, Czech republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, 
Slovak republic, Slovenia) European Union member countries (of course we consider the 
period before the economic crisis put a stress on revenue and expenditures sides of national 
fiscal budgets). Lack of fiscal discipline in many European Union member countries revealed 
a crucial need of a fiscal consolidation during the crisis period due to a sharp acceleration in 
sovereign debt burden.  
 
3. Overview of the Literature 
Fiscal consolidation based on tax increases and expenditures cuts is well documented 
in empirical literature. Tsibouris, Horton, Flanagan and Maliszewski (2006) provided an 
overview of the experience of countries that have challenged large fiscal adjustments in the 
last three decades. By identifying periods of successful and unsuccessful fiscal consolidations 
authors provide operational guidance to policymakers related to various aspects of fiscal 
adjustments, including common policy approaches, institutional arrangements and causal 
implications of various fiscal decisions. Barrios, Langedijk and Pench (2010) from estimated 
econometric models revealed determinants of successful fiscal consolidation while 
considering large scale of preconditions, including impacts of financial crisis, debt and deficit 
levels, real exchange rate adjustments, effects on economic growth as well as types of fiscal 
consolidation. Alesina and Perotti (1997) analyzed how the composition of fiscal adjustments 
(gradual versus sharp consolidation, expenditures versus tax revenues based consolidation) 
influences their likelihood of success in the view of long lasting deficit reduction, and their 
macroeconomic consequences. Overall success of fiscal consolidation is also evaluated 
concerning initial fiscal stance. Briotti (2002) analyzed the fiscal consolidation process in EU 
countries over the 1990s. From observed periods of fiscal adjustments authors highlight that 
revenue based adjustments have generally preceded expenditure based adjustments. Alesina 
and Ardagna (2009) examined the evidence of fiscal stimuli and fiscal adjustments episodes 
in OECD countries from 1970 to 2007. Authors discuss effects of adjustments on the 
spending and revenues sides concluding that tax cuts seem to have higher expansionary 
potential that spending increases while spending cuts associated with fiscal adjustments are 
more appropriate for stabilizing the sovereign debt than tax increases while having less 
deteriorating effect of the real output performance. 
 
Implications and expected success of fiscal consolidation is largely dependent on 
effects of tax (revenue) and expenditure based adjustments in the government budget on the 
overall macroeconomic performance. Contribution of fiscal policy shocks to i.e. slowdown in 
real output growth rates may provide useful information about contrary effects of fiscal 
consolidation and thus a convenient prospect about more feasible composition of fiscal policy 
arrangements. 
Effects of fiscal policy shocks are also well documented especially on a sample of 
developed countries. Blanchard and Perotti (Blanchard and Perotti, 1999) used mixed 
structural VAR/event study approach to identify the automatic responses of taxes and 
government spending to economic activity. They also argued that positive government 
spending shocks have a positive effect on output, and positive tax shocks have a negative 
effect, while the multipliers for both spending and tax shocks are typically small. 
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Perotti (Perotti, 2002) implemented SVAR approach in order to analyze the effect of 
fiscal policy on GDP, prices and interest rates in five OECD countries. The results we may 
conclude as follows: 1) The effects of fiscal policy on GDP and its components have become 
substantially weaker in the last 20 years; 2) The tax multipliers tend to be negative but small; 
3) Once plausible values of the price elasticity of governments spending are imposed, the 
negative effects of government spending on prices that have been frequently estimated 
become positive, although usually small and not always significant; 4) Government spending 
shocks have significant effects on the real short-term interest rate, but uncertain signs; 5) Net 
tax shocks have very small effects on prices; 6) The U.S. is an outlier in many dimensions; 
U.S. responses to fiscal shocks are often not representative of the average OECD country 
included in this sample. 
Giuliodori and Beetsma (Giuliodori and Beetsma, 2004) also implemented few 
identifications schemes using VAR methodology to analyze the (spill-over) effects of fiscal 
policy shocks in European economies. Their analysis is focused on the indirect channel of 
transmitting the fiscal policy shocks that affect an import of the country. They also 
emphasized a necessity of enhanced fiscal coordination at the macroeconomic level.  
Romer and Romer (Romer and Romer, 2007) analyze the causes and consequences in 
the level of taxation in the postwar U.S. Their results indicate that tax changes have very large 
effects on output. At the same time output effects are very persistent. Authors argue it is due 
to the strong response of investments to the tax burden decrease. 
Caldara and Camps (Caldara and Camps, 2008) provide an empirical evidence on the 
response of key macroeconomic variables to government spending and tax revenue shocks for 
the U.S. over the period 1955-2006. Authors implemented four approaches (the recursive 
approach, the Blanchard-Perotti approach, the sign-restrictions approach and the event-study 
approach) to identify their system based on the VAR methodology. While there is the 
empirical evidence that the positive responses of private consumption and the real wage are 
very persistent, authors argued that the most current-generation DSGE models consistent with 
an increase in these variables predict that the responses turn negative already about one year 
after the government spending shock occurs. They also find strongly diverging results as 
regards the effects of tax shocks depending on the identification approach used, with the 
estimated effects of unanticipated tax increases ranging from non-distortionary to strongly 
distortionary. 
 
4. Fiscal Consolidation 
4.1 Methodological Notes to Fiscal Consolidation 
Fiscal consolidation is usually addressed to the set of fiscal arrangements on the side 
of revenues and/or expenditures of the government budget in order to reduce a burden of 
sovereign debt via improved fiscal stance. As a result, crucial fiscal adjustments are employed 
relying primarily on expenditures cuts (especially in the area of government consumption and 
social security transfers) and much lower portion is based on tax increases (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1997). Another type of fiscal adjustments rely especially on the tax and social 
contributions increases. While the first type of fiscal adjustments is expansionary and usually 
has longer durability, second type of fiscal adjustments is restrictive, having contractionary 
effects on the economy and thus representing risks associated with future reductions in the tax 
capacity of the country. 
There seems to be several approaches to measure fiscal consolidation and to evaluate a 
success of fiscal consolidation episode. For example, Alesina and Ardagna (2009) identify 
three types of fiscal adjustment episodes. For the purpose of our study we employ two of 
these measures slightly revised by Barrios, Langedijk and Pench (2010): (1) Fiscal 
consolidation is the year at which CAPB improves by at least 1.5 percent of GDP (so called 
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cold shower) or (2) takes the place over three years provided CAPB will not deteriorate by 
more than 0.5 percent of GDP (so called gradual consolidation). Considering both 
definitions, cold showers (consolidations during one year) are recognized as full episodes of 
fiscal consolidation and each year of gradual consolidation are considered as episodes on their 
own. The last measure reflects the overall success of fiscal consolidation. Fiscal adjustments 
are evaluated according to their effects on sovereign debt and fiscal CAPB ratios to GDP and 
real output performance. (3) Fiscal consolidation is revealed as successful provided it helps to 
reduce sovereign debt to GDP ratio by 5 percent during three subsequent years after we have 
recognized an initiation of the fiscal episode. At the same time, successful fiscal consolidation 
is considered to be an effective only if it is able to bring down a debt ratio while not having 
deteriorating effect on real output.  
 
4.2 Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance 
To assess detailed overview of fiscal consolidation effects it is necessary to estimate 
an influence of fiscal adjustments based on tax and/or expenditures changes on fiscal balance. 
However, it seems to be necessary to reveal changes on revenues and expenditures sides of 
government balance associated with automatic effects induced by changes in macroeconomic 
environment and effects of discretionary fiscal policy actions. In first case, i.e. a cool-down of 
real output growth may be followed by a cut in government revenues (due to reduced tax 
capacity of an economy in the time of crisis) and an increase in government expenditures (i.e. 
due higher unemployment benefits). As a result, deterioration of a fiscal balance will occur. 
At the same time, similar effects on the fiscal balance will be followed by discretionary taxes 
cuts or expenditures increases. A fiscal stance of a government budget may thus reflect mixed 
effects of automatic changes in budgetary revenues and expenditures associated with business 
cycle fluctuations as well as discrete changes on both sides of government budgets associated 
with discrete fiscal policy actions. 
To eliminate effects of a business cycle to the fiscal stance of a government budget it 
is necessary to eliminate influence of cyclical movements of fiscal variables. As a result of 
filtered business cycle impacts, together with some other adjustments (i.e. exclusion of 
interest payable on the side of government expenditures), cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(CAPB) will be calculated. Empirical literature provides many approaches to calculate CAPB. 
In general, main algorithm follows the same procedure: (1) estimation of the potential GDP, 
(2) determination and calculation of key revenues and expenditures categories responses to 
the fluctuations in cyclical GDP, (3) adjustments in budgetary revenues and expenditures 
according to the cyclical effects in both sides of government budget. As a result we obtain 
cyclically adjusted structural or primary balance. On the other hand we have found some 
differences in step (2) in current empirical literature reflecting relative diversity in approaches 
employed to estimate income elasticities of main budgetary variables (on both revenue and 
expenditure sides). At the same time, most studies calculated cyclical component in real 
output by estimating potential output (and output gap) using simple HP filter1 or potential 
employment based on detrending NAIRU calculations. 
Bouthevillain et al. (2001) calculated fiscal elasticities using econometric regressions 
or derivation from tax or expenditures laws and from detailed information on the distribution 
of income and revenue. Altãr, Necula and Bobeica (2010) estimated tax and revenues elasticities by 
applying methodology similar to that employed by OECD and by the European Commission. Authors 
decomposed main components of revenue and expenditure budgetary sides using linear system of 
equations. Girouard and André (2005) calculated income elasticities of four different types of 
1 Despite a wide criticism of Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter for inducing a spurious cycle in the time series (i.e. it 
cannot reflect an impact of structural breaks) as well as for poor approximation near the endpoint (so called 
endpoint bias), it still represents one of most frequently used filter in the current empirical literature. 
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taxes while on the expenditure side there is only single item - unemployment related transfers 
- that authors treated as cyclically sensitive. 
Günaydın and Uğraş Ülkü (2002) employed vector-error correction (VEC) model to 
estimate income elasticities of budgetary components. Provided there is a long-run 
equilibrium (cointegration) between GDP and budgetary variables, expected elasticity 
coefficients are represented by normalized cointegrating coefficient derived from 
cointegrating equations. 
To cyclically adjust a government budget, that is to estimate the underlying fiscal 
position when cyclical and/or automatic components are removed we follow a VEC 
methodology implemented by Günaydın and Uğraş Ülkü (2002). 
Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (CAPB) is calculated by subtracting the cyclical 
component ( )CB  from the primary government balance ( )PB : 
 
,
1
  =  
n
C C
t t t t t i
i
CAPB PB B PB B
=
= − − ∑      (1) 
 
where ( )PB  represents actual government budget balance ( )B  less interests payable ( )IE : 
 
 It tPB B E= −       (2) 
 
and ( ),Ct iB  represents a cyclical component of each of n revenue and expenditure budgetary 
categories included in the model given by the following equation: 
 
, ,  .  . 
C gap
t i t i i tB B e Y=      (3) 
 
where ( )ie  represent individual elasticities of each particular budget category (that responds 
automatically to real output fluctuations) included in the model and ( )gapY  represents output 
gap expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
 
4.3 Income Elasticities of Budgetary Categories 
In our model we include three types of budget revenues (revenues from direct taxes, 
indirect taxes and social contributions) and one budget expenditure category (unemployment 
related transfers) that seem to respond to short-run (cyclical) movements in real output. As a 
result, we expect that selected fiscal variables automatically respond to the cyclical 
fluctuations in real output. 
To estimate income elasticities of budgetary categories we expect that there is a long-
run equilibrium relationship (cointegration) between each included fiscal variable and real 
output. Cointegration methodology introduced by Johansen (1988, 1991) and Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) will be employed to estimate the long-rum equilibrium relationships between 
different types of budgetary variables and real output in the European transition economies. 
Johansen method is applied to the unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) model that can be 
written by the following moving average representation of n non-stationary variables 
containing p lagged values: 
 
1 21 2 ... tt p t pt tY AY A Y A Y εµ −− −= + + + + +      (4) 
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where tY   is a   1n x vector of the contemporaneous endogenous variables,  μ is a   1n x  vector 
of the constants, iA  are   n x n  polynomial variance-covariance matrix, ( )0,t nN εε ∑  is a 
  1n x  normalized vector of exogenous shocks (innovations) to the model representing 
unexplained changes in the variables. 
If at least two of the variables are cointegrated of the order one (I(1)) the VAR 
representation in the equation (4) can be rewritten by subtracting 1tY −  to the following vector 
error correction model (VECM): 
 
1
1
        tt t p t i
p
i
i
Y Y Yµ ε− −
−
=
+ Π += Γ∆ + ∆∑      (5) 
 
where tY∆  is a   1n x  vector of the first differences of stochastic variables tY , 
1
p
i
i
A I
=
Π = −∑ , 
1
p
i j
j i
A
= +
Γ = −∑ , I is   n x n  identity matrix. 
Presented VECM contains information on both short-term and long-term adjustments to 
changes in tY  included in estimated Γ and Π respectively. Γ is a   n x n  matrix that represents 
the short-term dynamic - adjustments to changes in tY . Π is a   n x n  matrix consisting of the 
long-run coefficients - the cointegrating relationships (cointegrating vectors) and of the error 
correction term. Π can be decomposed as follows: 
 
'αβΠ =       (6) 
 
where α  represents   n x r  a loading matrix containing coefficients that describe the 
contribution of the r long-term (cointegrating) relationships in the individual equations and 
denotes the speed of adjustment from disequilibrium, while β  is a   n x r  matrix of long-run 
coefficients and represents the r linearly independent cointegrating vectors (each column of 
β  is the cointegrating vector). The number of cointegrating relations among variables of tY  is 
the same as the rank (r) for the matrix Π. If it has a full rank, the rank r n=  and it means 
there are n cointegrating relationships and that all variables are I(0). If a vector tY  is a vector 
of endogenous variables that are I(1), then all terms in equation (5) are I(0), and 1tY −Π  must 
be also stationary for I(0)nε   to be white noise. If the matrix Π has reduced rank, r n< , 
there are 1n −  cointegrating vectors and even if all endogenous variables in the model are 
I(1), the level-based long-run component would be stationary. VECM requires that there 
exists at least one cointegrating relationship.  
In order to find a presence of cointegrating (long-run) relationships, we use trace test 
and maximum eigenvalue test. Determination of rank and estimation of the coefficients are 
computed as maximum likelihood estimation. The corresponding likelihood-ratio test 
statistics are: 
 
( ) ( )
1
ln 1
n
trace i
i r
Trλ λ
− +
= − −∑

  ( ) ( )max 1ln, 1 1 rTr rλ λ += −+ −

  (7) 
 
where r is the number of cointegrating vectors under the null hypothesis and λ

 is the 
estimated value for the ith ordered eigenvalue from the Π matrix. Under the trace statistic, the 
null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r  is tested 
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against the alternative that there are more than r vectors. Whereas under the maximum 
eigenvalue test the null hypothesis that there are r cointegrating vectors is tested against the 
alternative of 1r +  cointegrating vectors. 
Provided that time series for direct tax revenues, indirect tax revenues, social 
contributions, unemployment related transfers and real output are I(1)2 we estimate four 
different VEC models employing quarterly data for the period 2000Q1-2012Q3 (51 
observations) for government expenditures, real output, inflation, tax revenues and short-term 
interest rates drawn from Eurostat - Government Finance Statistics (October 2012) and IMF 
database (International Financial Statistics, March 2013). Time series for direct tax revenues, 
indirect tax revenues, social contributions, unemployment related transfers and real output 
were seasonally adjusted. Tests for the cointegration were computed using two lags as 
recommended by the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion). 
Results of both Johansen cointegration procedures (trace statistics and maximum 
eigenvalue statistics) confirmed our hypothesis about existence of one long-run equilibrium 
(cointegrating) relationship between each fiscal variable and real output. Normalized 
cointegrating coefficients derived from each cointegrating equation represent elasticity 
coefficients of each fiscal category with respect to real output. 
 
4.4 Episodes of Fiscal Consolidation 
The figure 4 reveals identified episodes of fiscal consolidation in the European 
transition economies as well as the degree of their success since 2000. Individual countries 
have experienced several episodes of fiscal consolidation that in total represents 37 episodes 
of both types - one year consolidation (30) and gradual consolidation (7). However, we have 
assessed only 27 percent success in one year episodes of fiscal consolidations (8 cold showers 
succeeded). We have investigated only one successful gradual consolidation (14 percent 
degree of success). Our results are contrary to conclusions assessed by i.e. Barrios, Langedijk 
and Pench (2010) who performed investigation about a degree of fiscal consolidation success 
on the sample of EU15 countries since 1970. It seems that governments in our sample of 
countries significantly seek an effort to undertake gradual multi-year fiscal consolidations and 
thus strengthen financial discipline during a significant period of their political cycle. At the 
same time, none of six gradual consolidations (only one of them was successful) undertaken 
during the pre-crisis period was associated with deteriorating effects on the overall 
macroeconomic performance, revealing wasted chance of potentially effective fiscal 
consolidation. 
 
Figure 4 Fiscal Consolidation Episodes (2000Q1-2012Q3) 
 
 
2 Detail results of unit root test are not reported here to save space. Like any other results, they are available upon 
request from the author. 
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Note: Variables - cyclically adjusted primary balance - CAPB (GOV_B_CA) and annual rate (on quarterly basis) 
of the real GDP growth (GDP_RR) are expressed in percentage (right axis in figures). Sovereign debt (GOV_D) 
is expressed as percentage share on GDP (left axis in figures). Real effective exchange rate (REER) is expressed 
as index (left axis in figures) (2005 = 100) 
 unsuccessful one-year consolidation  unsuccessful gradual consolidation 
 successful one-year consolidation  successful gradual consolidation 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Bulgaria experienced four fiscal consolidations. First, one-year successful 
consolidation (2000Q4-2001Q3) seems to be revenue based, as it was associated with sharp 
increase in budgetary revenues (revenues (especially from direct taxes) rose faster than 
expenditures3). However, it doesn’t seem to be effective because during this period the rate of 
a real GDP growth decreased. During this period REER appreciated and thus weakening 
consolidation effort. Second, one-year successful consolidation (2002Q4-2003Q3) seems to 
be both revenue and expenditure based and main contribution refers to an increase in indirect 
taxes and minor decrease in the government consumption. It also seems to be effective 
because the rate of a real GDP growth during this period slightly increased. Rate of REER 
appreciation nearly stagnated and thus not weakening consolidation effort. Third, gradual 
successful consolidation (2003Q4-2007Q2) seems to be revenue based and main contribution 
refers to an increase in indirect taxes. It also seems to be effective because the rate of a real 
GDP growth during this period slightly increased. During this period REER followed 
appreciation trend and thus not contributed to the consolidation effort. Forth, one-year 
consolidation (2009Q3-2010Q2) seems to be unsuccessful despite a decrease in government 
expenditures as well as government consumption, revenues from direct and indirect taxes also 
decreased. During this period the real output growth rate decreased (not effective) and REER 
depreciated (contributive). 
Czech republic experienced four fiscal consolidations. First, one-year consolidation 
(2000Q3-2001Q2) seems to be unsuccessful despite a slight decrease in government 
expenditures as well as government consumption, while revenues from both direct and 
indirect taxes also decreased. During this period the real output growth rate increased 
(effective) and REER appreciated (not contributive). Second, one-year consolidation 
(2002Q3-2003Q2) seems to be also unsuccessful as it was associated with an increase in 
government expenditures as well as government consumption, while revenues from both 
direct and indirect taxes increased. During this period the real output growth rate increased 
(effective) and REER slightly depreciated (contributive). Third, one-year consolidation 
(2003Q4-2004Q3) seems to be also unsuccessful though it was associated with a decrease in 
government expenditures as well as government consumption and revenues from both direct 
and indirect taxes slightly increased. During this period the real output growth rate increased 
(effective) and REER appreciated (not contributive). Forth, gradual consolidation (2008Q3-
2012Q3) seems to be also unsuccessful as it was associated with an increase in government 
expenditures, though government consumption decreased and revenues from direct taxes 
decreased, while revenues from indirect taxes slightly increased. During this period the real 
output growth rate significantly decreased (ineffective) and REER depreciated (contributive). 
Estonia experienced four fiscal consolidations. First, one-year consolidation (2000Q1-
2000Q4) seems to be unsuccessful despite a decrease in government expenditures as well as 
government consumption, while revenues from direct taxes slightly decreased and revenues 
from indirect taxes slightly increased. During this period the real output growth rate 
significantly increased (effective) and REER did not change (neutral). Second, gradual 
consolidation (2001Q1-2004Q3) seems to be also unsuccessful though it was associated with 
a slight decrease in government expenditures as well as government consumption and 
revenues from direct taxes slightly increased, while revenues from indirect taxes decreased. 
During this period the real output growth rate decreased (ineffective) and REER appreciated 
(not contributive). Third, one-year consolidation (2008Q2-2009Q1) seems to be also 
unsuccessful as government expenditures and government consumption increased, while 
revenues from direct taxes slightly increased and revenues from indirect taxes slightly 
decreased. During this period the real output growth rate significantly decreased (not 
3 Development of budgetary components in this section is evaluated according to their share in GDP. 
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effective) and REER slightly appreciated (not contributive). Fourth, one-year consolidation 
(2009Q2-2010Q1) seems to be also unsuccessful as government expenditures slightly 
increased though government consumption decreased and revenues from both direct and 
indirect taxes increased. During this period the real output growth rate slightly decreased 
(ineffective) and REER slightly depreciated (contributive). 
Hungary experienced five fiscal consolidations. First, one-year consolidation 
(2003Q1-2003Q4) seems to be also unsuccessful despite a decrease in both government 
expenditures and government consumption, while revenues from direct taxes slightly 
decreased and revenues from indirect taxes slightly increased. During this period the real 
output growth rate almost did not change (neutral) and REER depreciated (contributive). 
Second, one-year consolidation (2006Q3-2007Q2) seems to be also unsuccessful despite a 
decrease in government expenditures as well as government consumption, while revenues 
from both direct and indirect taxes slightly increased. During this period the real output 
growth rate decreased (ineffective) and REER significantly appreciated (not contributive). 
Third, one-year consolidation (2008Q2-2009Q1) seems to be also unsuccessful as 
government expenditures slightly increased though government consumption slightly 
decreased, while revenues from direct taxes slightly increased and revenues from indirect 
taxes slightly decreased. During this period the real output growth rate decreased (ineffective) 
and REER significantly depreciated (contributive). Fourth, one-year consolidation (2009Q2-
2010Q1) seems to be also unsuccessful despite a slight decrease in government expenditures 
though government consumption increased, while revenues from direct taxes decreased and 
revenues from indirect taxes increased. During this period the real output growth rate 
decreased (ineffective) and REER appreciated (not contributive). Fifth, one-year 
consolidation (2010Q2-2011Q1) seems to be successful and especially revenue based though 
government expenditures slightly decreased too, while government consumption slightly 
increased. Despite revenues from both direct and indirect taxes decreased, overall government 
revenues significantly increased (due to nationalization of private pension-fund assets). 
During this period the real output growth rate significantly increased (effective) and REER 
appreciated (not contributive). 
Lithuania experienced two fiscal consolidations. First, gradual consolidation 
(2000Q1-2002Q4) seems to be unsuccessful though it was associated with a significant 
reduction in government expenditures, while government consumption increased and 
revenues from both direct and indirect taxes also decreased. During this period the real output 
growth rate significantly increased (effective) and REER appreciated (not contributive). 
Second, one-year consolidation (2004Q4-2005Q3) seems to be successful and both revenue 
and expenditure based as it was associated with a slight reduction in government expenditures 
and government consumption slightly increased and revenues from both direct and indirect 
taxes slightly increased too. During this period the real output growth rate almost did not 
change (neutral) and REER depreciated (contributive). 
Latvia experienced four fiscal consolidations. First, gradual consolidation (2000Q1-
2003Q4) seems to be unsuccessful though it was associated with a significant reduction in 
government expenditures, while government consumption increased and revenues from direct 
taxes almost did not change, while revenues from indirect taxes decreased. During this period 
the real output growth rate significantly increased (effective) and REER depreciated 
(contributive). Second, one-year consolidation (2004Q2-2005Q1) seems to be successful and 
revenue based as it was associated with a slight increase in government expenditures and 
government consumption, while revenues from direct taxes slightly increased and revenues 
from indirect taxes slightly decreased. During this period the real output growth rate slightly 
decreased (not effective) and REER depreciated (contributive). Third, one-year consolidation 
(2008Q2-2009Q1) seems to be unsuccessful as government expenditures significantly 
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increased though government consumption slightly decreased, while revenues from direct 
taxes slightly increased and revenues from indirect taxes increased. During this period the real 
output growth rate significantly decreased (ineffective) and REER appreciated (not 
contributive). Fourth, one-year consolidation (2009Q2-2010Q1) seems to be also 
unsuccessful as government expenditures slightly increased though government consumption 
decreased and revenues from direct taxes decreased while revenues from indirect taxes 
increased. During this period the real output growth rate decreased (ineffective) and REER 
depreciated (contributive). 
Poland experienced two fiscal consolidations. First, one-year consolidation (2004Q3-
2005Q2) seems to be unsuccessful as government expenditures slightly increased though 
government consumption slightly decreased, while revenues from both direct and indirect 
taxes increased. During this period the real output growth rate decreased (ineffective) and 
REER appreciated (not contributive). Second, one-year consolidation (2011Q2-2012Q1) 
seems to be also unsuccessful though government expenditures slightly decreased, while 
government consumption slightly increased and revenues from both direct and indirect taxes 
slightly decreased. During this period the real output growth rate decreased (ineffective) and 
REER depreciated (contributive). 
Romania experienced four fiscal consolidations. First, gradual consolidation 
(2000Q1-2002Q4) seems to be unsuccessful, though it was associated with a significant 
reduction in government expenditures, while government consumption increased and 
revenues from both direct and indirect taxes also decreased. During this period the real output 
growth rate significantly increased (effective) and REER appreciated (not contributive). 
Second, one-year consolidation (2005Q3-2006Q2) seems to be successful and revenue based 
as it was associated with a slight increase in government expenditures, though government 
consumption slightly decreased and revenues from direct taxes increased, while revenues 
from indirect taxes decreased. During this period the real output growth rate increased 
(effective) and REER appreciated (not contributive Third, one-year consolidation (2009Q2-
2010Q1) seems to be unsuccessful as it was associated with an increase in government 
expenditures, while government consumption decreased and revenues from direct taxes 
increased, while revenues from indirect taxes decreased. During this period the real output 
growth rate decreased (ineffective) and REER appreciated (not contributive). Fourth, one-
year consolidation (2010Q2-2011Q1) seems to be also unsuccessful, though government 
expenditures and government consumption slightly decreased, while revenues from direct 
taxes decreased and revenues from indirect taxes increased. During this period the real output 
growth rate increased (effective) and REER appreciated (not contributive). 
Slovenia experienced four fiscal consolidations. First, one-year consolidation 
(2001Q2-2002Q1) seems to be unsuccessful, though government expenditures decreased, 
while government consumption slightly increased and revenues from direct taxes did not 
change, while revenues from indirect taxes increased. During this period the real output 
growth rate decreased (ineffective) and REER appreciated (not contributive). Second, gradual 
consolidation (2002Q2-2005Q1) seems to be unsuccessful, though it was associated with a 
reduction in government expenditures, while government consumption increased and 
revenues from direct taxes increased, while revenues from indirect taxes slightly decreased. 
During this period the real output growth rate increased (effective) and REER appreciated 
(not contributive). Third, one-year consolidation (2008Q4-2009Q3) seems to be unsuccessful 
as it was associated with an increase in government expenditures and government 
consumption, while revenues from both direct and indirect taxes decreased. During this period 
the real output growth rate significantly decreased (ineffective) and REER appreciated (not 
contributive). Fourth, one-year consolidation (2011Q3-2012Q2) seems to be unsuccessful, 
though it was associated with a decrease in government expenditures and government 
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consumption, while revenues from both direct and indirect taxes decreased. During this period 
the real output growth rate decreased (ineffective) and REER slightly depreciated 
(contributive). 
Slovak republic experienced four fiscal consolidations. First, one-year consolidation 
(2000Q4-2001Q3) seems to be successful and expenditure based as it was associated with a 
significant decrease in government expenditures, though government consumption slightly 
increased and revenues from direct taxes slightly increased, while revenues from indirect 
taxes decreased. During this period the real output growth rate increased (effective) and 
REER appreciated (not contributive). Second, one-year consolidation (2002Q4-2003Q3) 
seems to be also successful and both revenue and expenditure based as it was associated with 
a decrease in government expenditures and government consumption and an increase in 
revenues from both direct and indirect taxes. During this period the real output growth rate 
did not change (neutral) and REER significantly appreciated (not contributive). Third, one-
year consolidation (2008Q4-2009Q3) seems to be unsuccessful as it was associated with an 
increase in government expenditures and government consumption, while revenues from both 
direct and indirect taxes decreased. During this period the real output growth rate significantly 
decreased (ineffective) and REER slightly appreciated (not contributive). Fourth, one-year 
consolidation (2011Q1-2011Q4) seems to be unsuccessful, though it was associated with a 
slight decrease in government expenditures and government consumption, while revenues 
from both direct and indirect taxes slightly increased. During this period the real output 
growth rate decreased (ineffective) and REER did not change (neutral). 
 
5. Fiscal Policy Shocks 
5.1 Econometric Model 
Understanding effects of fiscal policy shocks (negative government expenditure shock, 
positive direct and indirect tax revenue shock) on real output would help us to assess an 
impact of an initiation of the fiscal consolidation episodes. As a result, we should be able to 
reveal an appropriateness of fiscal revenues and expenditures based adjustments in each 
particular economy. Comparison of results for pre-crisis and extended period seems to be 
convenient to identify effects of the crisis period on particular fiscal adjustments feasibility. 
Approach we use in our analysis to estimate effects of fiscal policy shocks is based on 
the vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology. In order to recover the structural shocks that 
affect the endogenous variables of the model we implement two identification approaches. 
First approach is based on the recursive Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance 
matrix of the model residuals. The recursive identification approach also considers the causal 
ordering of the variables. Second approach is based on the identification scheme that imposes 
long-run restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix of the model residuals. Nevertheless 
both approaches uses different scheme to recover structural shocks we expect they both 
provide comparable results of the effects of the fiscal policy shocks in the selected group of 
transition economies. 
True model is represented by the following infinite vector moving average 
representation: 
 
-10 ( )  t ttY A L Y BA ε+=      (7) 
 
where tY  is a   1n x  vector of the endogenous macroeconomic variables, ( )A L  is a 
polynomial variance-covariance matrix (represents impulse-response functions of the shocks 
to the elements of Y) of lag-length l, L is lag operator and ( )tε  is a   1k x  vector of identically 
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normally distributed, serially uncorrelated and mutually orthogonal white noise disturbances 
(vector of true structural shocks in elements of Y): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]0,     ' I,    '       0t t t t sE E E t sεε ε ε ε ε= = Σ = = ∀ ≠    (8) 
 
The vector tY  of the endogenous variables of the model consists of the following five 
elements: government expenditures ( )tg , real output ( ),r ty , tax revenues ( )tt , inflation ( )tp  
and short-term interest rates ( )ti . In our five-variate model we assume five exogenous shocks 
that determine endogenous variables - government expenditures shock ( ),g tε , demand shock 
( ),ry tε , tax revenues shock ( ),t tε , inflation shock ( ),p tε  and monetary policy shock ( ),nir tε .  
By multiplying equation (7) by an inverse matrix 10−A  we obtain the reduced-form of 
the VAR model (this adjustment is necessary because the model represented by the equation 
(7) is not directly observable and structural shocks cannot by correctly identified): 
 
1 1
1 10 0        ( ) ( )t tt t tA A uY A L Y C L YBε
− −
− −+ = +=     (9) 
 
where ( )C L  is again a matrix representing the relationship among variables on the lagged 
values and tu  is a   1n x  vector of normally distributed shocks (shocks in reduced form) that 
are serially uncorrelated but can be contemporaneously correlated with each other: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
2
1 12 13
2
12 1 23
2
13 23 1
0,     '  ,    '       0ut t t t sE u E u u E u u t s
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
 
 
= = Σ = = ∀ ≠ 
 
 
   (10) 
 
Equation (9) reveals the relationship between reduced-form VAR disturbances tu  and 
structural disturbances ( )tε , that is given by 
 
1
0 = t tu A Bε
−  or 0  = t tA u Bε      (11) 
 
As we have already mentioned we implement an identification scheme based on two 
approaches. The first, recursive approach, is based on the Cholesky decomposition of 
innovations that allows us to identify structural shocks hitting the model. Cholesky 
decomposition of variance-covariance matrix of VAR residuals defines the matrix 0A  as a 
lower triangular matrix and matrix B  as k-dimensional identity matrix. 
The lower triangularity of 0A  implies a recursive scheme among variables that has 
clear economic implications and has to be empirically tested as any other relationship. 
Identification scheme of the matrix 0A  implies that some structural shocks have no 
contemporaneous effects on some endogenous variables given the ordering of the endogenous 
variables. 
At the same time the off-diagonal elements of B are all zero, implying that we do not 
allow for the structural shocks to be mutually correlated. This assumption is consistent with 
empirical results - the correlation between government spending and tax revenue shocks is not 
statistically different from zero. 
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The equation (11) we can now rewrite to the following form: 
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, ,21
, ,31 32
, ,41 42 43
51 52 53 54 , ,
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
  1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1
r r
n n
g t g t
y t y t
p t p t
t t t t
i t i t
u
u
ua a
ua a a
a a a a u
a
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
=
      
      
      
      
      
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            
    (12) 
 
The ordering of variables reveals following relations among them: 
• Government expenditures don’t respond contemporaneously to the shock from any 
other endogenous variable of the model. 
• Real output doesn’t respond contemporaneously to inflation, tax revenue and interest 
rate shocks, while it is contemporaneously affected only by the government 
expenditure shock. 
• Inflation doesn’t respond contemporaneously to the tax revenue and interest rate 
shocks, while it is contemporaneously affected by the government expenditure and the 
real output shocks. 
• Tax revenues don’t respond contemporaneously to the interest rates shock, while it is 
contemporaneously affected by the government expenditure, the real output and tax 
revenue shocks. 
• Interest rates are contemporaneously affected by the shocks from all of the 
endogenous variables of the model. 
 
It is also necessary to emphasize that after the initial period the endogenous variables 
of the model can interact freely without any restrictions. 
 
The second approach, structural VAR (SVAR) approach, is based on decomposing a 
series into its permanent and temporary components. It imposes long-run restrictions to the 
reduced-form VAR model. Identification scheme in the SVAR models reflects a long-run 
neutrality assumption so that we expect the cumulative effect of a certain shock on the certain 
endogenous variable development is zero. The equation (11) we can now rewrite to the 
following form: 
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    (13) 
 
In order to correctly identify the model we impose following long-run restrictions: 
• Government expenditures do not have a permanent effect on tax revenues. 
• Real output does not have a permanent effect on government expenditures and 
inflation. 
• Inflation does not have a permanent effect on government expenditures and real 
output. 
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• Tax revenues do not have a permanent effect on government expenditures. 
• Interest rates do not have a permanent effect on any other endogenous variable of the 
model. 
 
Both systems are now just-identified and can be estimated using vector autoregression. 
From both identified true models we compute impulse-response functions to estimate the 
responses of the real output to the one standard deviation fiscal shocks. Effects of fiscal 
consolidating adjustments on the real output are calculated for two periods (pre-crisis with 
data 2000Q1-2007Q4 (model A) and extended with data 2000Q1-2012Q3 (model B)) to 
reveal crisis effects on fiscal consolidation efforts. Effects of shocks in each particular fiscal 
variable (negative (decrease) government expenditure shock ( ),ε g t  and one standard 
deviation positive (increase) direct tax ( ),εdt t  and indirect tax ( ),ε it t  revenues shocks) on the 
macroeconomic performance were computed from separately estimated VAR models. As a 
result, three models were estimated with following endogenous variables: 
• model A1, B1 ( ), ,, , , ,  t r t t t n tt g y p t iY =     
• model A2, B2 ( ), ,, , , ,  t r t t t n tt g y p dt iY =     
• model A3, B3 ( ), ,, , , ,  t r t t t n tt g y p it iY =     
Impulse-response functions calculated from estimated VAR models with true shocks 
identified employing both identification schemes (based on Cholesky factorization and 
structural factorization) provided very similar results that is why we present results from 
structural VAR models (estimated results from models identified by recursive identification 
scheme are available upon request from the author). However, under Cholesky identification 
structure, the real government spending is not contemporaneously (within the same quarter) 
affected by changes in the real economic activity. That is the reason why government 
expenditure shock is considered as a discretionary fiscal adjustment. On the other hand, tax 
revenues are contemporaneously affected by the changes in the real economic activity and 
thus respond automatically to the real output adjustments. 
As a result, structural VAR models seem to be more convenient for estimation of 
discrete fiscal shocks (both expenditure and revenue based) because recursive approach is 
sensitive to variables ordering and thus it has impact on shocks interpretation. In our model, 
tax revenues are positioned behind real output. As a result, associated changes in tax revenues 
could be interpreted as automatic response to changes in real output (due to cyclical 
adjustment) and operating more as automatic stabilizers while it rules out any impact response 
out real output to a revenue shock (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). 
 
5.2 Data and Results 
In order to estimate our model represented by five endogenous variables for each 
country from the group of the European transition economies (Bulgaria, Czech republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak republic and Slovenia) we 
employ quarterly data ranging from 2000Q1 to 2007Q4 (32 observations) for model A and 
quarterly data from 2000Q1 to 2012Q3 (51 observations) for model B for the government 
expenditures, real gross domestic product, inflation, tax revenues and short term interest rates 
(figure 5). Time series for endogenous variables were drawn from Eurostat - Government 
Finance Statistics (October 2012) and IMF database - International Financial Statistics 
(March 2013). 
 
 
20 
 
Figure 5 Government Expenditures, Real output, Inflation, Tax Revenues and Interest 
Rates in the European Transition Economies (2000Q1-2012Q3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Endogenous variables - government expenditures (GOV_E), real output (GDP), tax revenues (GOV_T), 
direct tax revenues (GOV_DT) and indirect tax revenues (GOV_IT) are expressed as indexes (left axis in 
figures) (2005 = 100). Inflation (CPI) and interest rates (IR) are expressed in percentage (right axis in figures). 
Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from Eurostat - Government Finance Statistics (October 2012) 
and IMF - International Financial Statistics (March 2013). 
 
Time series for the quarterly government expenditures, real output and tax revenues 
were seasonally adjusted. Time series for the nominal government expenditures and tax 
revenues were deflated using gross domestic product deflator. As an inflation indicator we 
used core inflation without food and energy. As a short-term interest rates indicator we used 
national interbank offered rates for the deposits with 3 months maturity. 
Before we estimate the model it is necessary to test the time series for stationarity and 
cointegration. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests were 
computed to test the endogenous variables for the existence of unit roots. Both ADF and PP 
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tests indicate that most variables are non-stationary on the values so that the null hypothesis 
of a unit root cannot be rejected for any of the series. Testing variables on the first differences 
indicates the time series are stationary so that we conclude that variables are I(1). 
Because most of endogenous variables had a unit root on values it is necessary to test 
time series for cointegration using the Johansen and Juselius cointegration test (we found it 
reasonable to include variables I(0) for testing purposes following economic logic of expected 
results). The test for the cointegration was computed using two lags as recommended by the 
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and SIC (Schwarz Information Criterion). The results of 
the Johansen cointegration tests confirmed the results of the unit root tests. Both trace 
statistics and maximum eigenvalue statistics (both at 0.05 level) indicate that there is no 
cointegration among endogenous variables in most of estimated models (trace statistics 
reported a presence of single cointegrating equation in some models). However, increasing 
the lag length to three quarters resulted in the loss of long-run equilibrium among variables. 
The results of unit root and cointegration tests are not reported here to save space. Like any 
other results, they are available upon request from the author. 
To test the stability of the VAR model we also applied a number of diagnostic tests. 
We found no evidence of serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity effect in the disturbances. The model also passes the Jarque-Bera normality 
test, so that errors seem to be normally distributed. The VAR models seem to be stable also 
because the inverted roots of the model for each country lie inside the unit.  
 
Before we estimate VAR model we have to solve some model specification issues. In 
section 4.3 we have estimated four bivariate models consisting of one particular fiscal 
variable and real output considering that there exist long-run equilibrium relationships in each 
model. Existence of cointegrating relationship (assumption widely confirmed by many 
empirical studies) was required to calculate income elasticities of budgetary categories. 
Presence on one cointegrating equation in each model was confirmed by Johansen 
cointegrating test statistics. Thus, we have estimated VEC models. 
However, testing five-variate models in section 5.2 for cointegration revealed 
ambiguous results. While trace statistics mostly confirmed the presence of single 
cointegrating equation, maximum eigenvalue statistics reported no cointegration in majority 
of countries (both at 0.05 level). Despite possible candidates for cointegration (fiscal variables 
and real output) we may find another potential couple of variables for cointegration - tax 
revenues and government expenditures, though according to Blanchard and Perotti (2002) the 
imposition of a cointegration between government expenditures and tax revenues leads to 
very similar results in estimated effects of fiscal shocks (as a result such an expected 
cointegration may be confusing in estimating the cointegration rank). At the same time, 
Caldara and Camps (2008) suggest that in order to avoid imposing a wrong cointegration rank 
(in systems with just one ambiguous cointegration it seems to be quite disputable) it may be 
convenient to estimate unrestricted VAR models instead of VEC models. 
 
Following the results of the stationarity and cointegration tests we estimate three 
SVAR models for pre-crisis (2000-2007) and extended period (2000-2012) for each country 
from the group of European transition economies using the variables in the first differences to 
calculate impulse-response functions of government expenditures, direct taxes and indirect 
taxes (responses of the real output to a negative one standard deviation government 
expenditures shock and positive one standard deviation tax revenues shocks). Estimated 
responses of the real output fiscal shocks help us to evaluated macroeconomic effects of 
revenue and expenditure based fiscal adjustments and thus assess indirect costs of fiscal 
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consolidation. At the same time, by estimating models for pre-crisis and extended period we 
evaluate crisis related costs of fiscal adjustments.  
In figures 6-8 we summarize the responses of the real output to the negative (decrease) 
government expenditure shock and positive (increase) direct and indirect tax revenues during 
the pre-crisis period (model A1 with data 2000Q1-2007Q4) in the European transition 
economies. In figures 9-11 we summarize the responses of the real output to the negative 
(decrease) government expenditure shock and positive (increase) direct and indirect tax 
revenues during the extended period (model B1 with data 2000Q1-2012Q3) in the European 
transition economies. 
In the figure 6 we summarize responses of the real output to the one standard 
deviation government expenditures for the model with time series for the pre-crisis period 
(model A1) in the European transition economies. 
 
Figure 6 Responses of Real Output to the Negative Government Expenditures Shock  
(2000Q1-2007Q4) (Model A) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Negative shock (decrease in) government expenditures shock was followed by the real 
output decline in all countries from the group. Despite some differences in the intensity of the 
shock it seems that the negative effect culminated within first year after the shock and steadily 
died out with next two years. Government expenditures shock seems to be neutral in the long-
run and not affecting leading path of the real output.  
In the figure 7 we summarize responses of the real output to the one standard 
deviation shock of direct tax revenues for the model with time series for the pre-crisis period 
(model A1) in the European transition economies. 
 
Figure 7 Responses of Real Output to the Positive Direct Tax Revenues Shock  
(2000Q1-2007Q4) (Model A) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
-1.00%
-0.75%
-0.50%
-0.25%
0.00%
0.25%
0.50%
0.75%
1.00%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
GOV_E_CZ GOV_E_HU GOV_E_PL
GOV_E_SI GOV_E_SK
Response of GDP to Structural One S.D. Innovations
(2000Q1-2007Q4, Model A)
-1.00%
-0.75%
-0.50%
-0.25%
0.00%
0.25%
0.50%
0.75%
1.00%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
GOV_E_EE GOV_E_LT GOV_E_LV
Response of GDP to Structural One S.D. Innovations
(2000Q1-2007Q4, Model A)
-1.00%
-0.75%
-0.50%
-0.25%
0.00%
0.25%
0.50%
0.75%
1.00%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
GOV_E_BG GOV_E_RO
Response of GDP to Structural One S.D. Innovations
(2000Q1-2007Q4, Model A)
-1.00%
-0.75%
-0.50%
-0.25%
0.00%
0.25%
0.50%
0.75%
1.00%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
GOV_DT_CZ GOV_DT_HU GOV_DT_PL
GOV_DT_SI GOV_DT_SK
Response of GDP to Structural One S.D. Innovations
(2000Q1-2007Q4, Model A)
-1.00%
-0.75%
-0.50%
-0.25%
0.00%
0.25%
0.50%
0.75%
1.00%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
GOV_DT_EE GOV_DT_LT GOV_DT_LV
Response of GDP to Structural One S.D. Innovations
(2000Q1-2007Q4, Model A)
-1.00%
-0.75%
-0.50%
-0.25%
0.00%
0.25%
0.50%
0.75%
1.00%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
GOV_DT_BG GOV_DT_RO
Response of GDP to Structural One S.D. Innovations
(2000Q1-2007Q4, Model A)
23 
 
Positive (increase in) direct tax revenues shock had negative impact on the real output 
in all countries from the group. In comparison with government expenditures shock it seems 
that negative effect of the shock was slightly higher and reached its peak with little time shift. 
As a result, the negative shock in direct revenues caused a real output decline during 4-6 
quarters following initial impulse. Negative effect of the shock died out during the third year 
after the shock and as a result, the shock seems to be neutral in the long run. Despite quite 
similar features of the real output responses in all countries from the group we have revealed 
some differences in intensity as well as durability of the shock. 
In the figure 8 we summarize responses of the real output to the one standard 
deviation shock of indirect tax revenues for the model with time series for the pre-crisis 
period (model A1) in the European transition economies. 
 
Figure 8 Responses of Real Output to the Positive Indirect Tax Revenues Shock  
(2000Q1-2007Q4) (Model A) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
It seems to be clear that the positive (increase in) indirect tax revenues shock was 
followed by the real output decline. However, we have observed a slightly delayed negative 
response of real economic activities. Despite some differences identified across individual 
countries it seems that a negative effect of the shock culminated during the second year after 
the shock. At the same time, initial response of the real output is mostly weak and moderately 
increase over the time. Negative effect of the shock seems to be neutral in the long run as its 
impact of the real output died out during the third year after the shock. 
Analysis of effects of fiscal policy shocks during the pre-crisis period reveled 
interesting implications about side (macroeconomic) effects of fiscal adjustments associated 
with tax and expenditure based fiscal consolidation in the European transition economies. 
Both, government expenditures reductions and tax revenues increases were followed by real 
output declines. However, effects of expenditure based adjustments seem to be more 
significant within the same fiscal year (effects of the shock culminated during first four 
quarters). As a result, expenditure based approach seems to be more convenient (effective) for 
episodes of gradual fiscal consolidations provided that distortionary effects on the real output 
tend to be reduced during the year following fiscal adjustment. On the other hand, effects of 
adjustments in both direct and indirect tax revenues were largely distributed across several 
years (with slightly reduced deteriorating effect during the first year in most countries) and 
thus revenue based fiscal adjustments seem to be more appropriate for episodes of one-year 
fiscal consolidations. 
 
In the figure 9 we summarize responses of the real output to the one standard 
deviation government expenditures for the model with time series for the extended period 
(model B1) in the European transition economies. 
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Figure 9 Responses of Real Output to the Negative Government Expenditures Shock  
(2000Q1-2012Q3) (Model B) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Crisis period affected responses of real output to the negative (decrease in) 
government expenditures shock across individual countries with a different manner. Despite 
questionable effects on changes in intensity of the deteriorating impact it seems that durability 
of the negative real output response slightly increased thought overall effect in the long run 
remained neutral (and effect of the shock died out within three years period). Thus, crisis 
period seem to extend negative effects associated with government expenditures adjustments. 
As a result, time vulnerability of real output to expenditure based fiscal adjustments during 
the crisis period increased.  
 
In the figure 10 we summarize responses of the real output to the one standard 
deviation shock of direct tax revenues for the model with time series for the extended period 
(model B1) in the European transition economies. 
 
Figure 10 Responses of Real Output to the Positive Direct Tax Revenues Shock  
(2000Q1-2012Q3) (Model B) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Due to crisis period we have examined slightly changed responses of real output to the 
positive (increase in) direct tax revenues shock in all countries from the group. It seems that 
not only increased durability of the deteriorating effects on the real output occurred but also 
overall drop in the real output increased. Although overall effect of the shock seems to be 
neutral in the long run, its effect died out till the end of the fourth year. As a result, real output 
became more vulnerable (as of intensity as well as durability of the effect) to direct tax based 
fiscal adjustments during the crisis period.  
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In the figure 11 we summarize responses of the real output to the one standard 
deviation shock of indirect tax revenues for the model with time series for the extended period 
(model B1) in the European transition economies. 
 
Figure 11 Responses of Real Output to the Positive Indirect Tax Revenues Shock  
(2000Q1-2012Q3) (Model B) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Analysis of the real output responses to the positive (increase in) indirect tax revenues 
shock revealed quite similar results in comparison with effects of the direct tax revenues 
shock. Despite quite similar intensity of the real output decline, all countries from the group 
have experienced higher persistence of the deteriorating effect of the shock. As a result, the 
negative effect of the tax revenues shock on the real output endured around 3-5 years and thus 
significantly prolonged side effects of the indirect tax (revenue) based fiscal adjustments 
during the crisis period. 
Crisis period accelerated negative side (macroeconomic) effects of fiscal adjustments 
associated with tax and expenditure based fiscal consolidation in the European transition 
economies. Generally, we emphasize increased durability of deteriorating effects of fiscal 
adjustments (both revenue and expenditure based) on the real output. Provided that a degree 
of success of fiscal adjustments during the crisis period is reduced due to excessive pressures 
on both revenues and expenditure sides it seems that increased durability of real output 
deterioration, followed by tax and/or revenue based adjustments, significantly reduced a 
degree of success to perform an effective (without deteriorating side effects on real output) 
fiscal consolidation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the paper we have analyzed main trends in the financial stance of general 
governments in ten European transition economies during last two decades. Brief overview of 
main trends in selected fiscal indicators and rapid deterioration in the fiscal policy stance 
during the crisis period revealed a crucial need of fiscal consolidation as it became urgent 
almost immediately after the debt crisis contagion flooded Europe. 
We have identified episodes of successful and unsuccessful (cold showers versus 
gradual) fiscal (expenditure versus revenue based) consolidations by analyzing effects of 
improvements in cyclically adjusted primary balance on the sovereign debt ratio reduction. 
Individual countries have experienced several episodes of fiscal consolidation that in total 
represents 37 episodes of both types - one year consolidation (30) and gradual consolidation 
(7). However, we have assessed only 27 percent success in one year episodes of fiscal 
consolidations (8 cold showers succeeded). We have investigated only one successful gradual 
consolidation (14 percent degree of success). It seems that governments in our sample of 
countries significantly seek an effort to undertake gradual multi-year fiscal consolidations and 
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thus strengthen financial discipline during a significant period of their political cycle. At the 
same time, none of six gradual consolidations (only one of them was successful) undertaken 
during the pre-crisis period was associated with deteriorating effects on the overall 
macroeconomic performance, revealing wasted chance of potentially effective fiscal 
consolidation. 
We have also estimated VAR model to analyze effects of fiscal shocks (based on one 
standard deviation (fall) in total expenditure and (rise) in direct and indirect taxes) to real 
output. Both, government expenditures reductions and tax revenues increases were followed 
by real output declines. However, effects of expenditure based adjustments seem to be more 
significant within the same fiscal year (effects of the shock culminated during first four 
quarters). As a result, expenditure based approach seems to be more convenient (effective) for 
episodes of gradual fiscal consolidations provided that distortionary effects on the real output 
tend to be reduced during the year following fiscal adjustment. On the other hand, effects of 
adjustments in both direct and indirect tax revenues were largely distributed across several 
years (with slightly reduced deteriorating effect during the first year in most countries) and 
thus revenue based fiscal adjustments seem to be more appropriate for episodes of one-year 
fiscal consolidations. 
Crisis period accelerated negative side (macroeconomic) effects of fiscal adjustments 
associated with tax and expenditure based fiscal consolidation in the European transition 
economies. Generally, we emphasize increased durability of deteriorating effects of fiscal 
adjustments (both revenue and expenditure based) on the real output. Provided that a degree 
of success of fiscal adjustments during the crisis period is reduced due to excessive pressures 
on both revenues and expenditure sides it seems, that increased durability of real output 
deterioration, followed by tax and/or revenue based adjustments, significantly reduced a 
degree of success to perform an effective (without deteriorating side effects on real output) 
fiscal consolidation. 
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